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People share a common fear of a substantial decline in economic
well-being, or even worse, a fall into poverty. Work in the
marketplace is the principal source of income in modern
societies, and the transition from work to retirement can be
fraught with economic risks. Hence, it is not surprising that all
post-industrialized societies have developed sophisticated social
and private institutions to mitigate these risks.
Perhaps the single greatest achievement of social policy in the
United States over the last three decades has been reducing
poverty in old age. The transition from work to retirement is no
longer economically perilous for the vast majority of older
American workers. For most married couples, the risk of falling
into poverty even several years after retirement is small. But
when one partner of the marriage dies, the survivor faces another
much more risky economic transition. The single greatest risk of
falling into poverty in old age now comes after the death of a
spouse, as the survivor faces life after marriage. And this risk
disproportionately affects older women, who are nearly three
times as likely as older men to be widowed (49 percent to 14
percent) and can expect to remain widowed an average of 17
years (Population Resource Center 1994).
Here we document the disproportionate risk of poverty faced by
such survivors and show that the Social Security system in the
1
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United States has been much less successful in protecting single
older people from poverty, especially single older women, than
government-administered Social Security systems in other postindustrialized countries. We argue that this lack of success stems
in part from the failure of the Social Security program to
transform the basis for its payout rules from a “traditional” oneearner family model to a model more consistent with today’s
families in which both the husband and wife work. We then offer
a budget neutral plan to redistribute some of the benefits a
married couple receive over their lifetime from the years whey
they are both alive to the years following the death of a spouse,
which we argue would substantially reduce the risk of poverty
faced by older women.
Insuring Economic Well-Being in Retirement:
Successes and Failures
A major success story in federal policy over the last three decades
has been the dramatic improvement in the economic well-being
of the aged (Quinn and Smeeding 1993; Smolensky, Danziger,
and Gottschalk 1988). Formerly, retirement from the workforce
was closely linked to a substantial decline in income and an
increased risk of poverty. However, the poverty rate for people
aged 65 and older has dropped from more than one in three in
1959 to about one in eight by 1992. As recently as 1970, older
people were more than twice as likely to be poor as people under
age 65. Since 1982 those aged 65 and older have been on average
less likely to live in poverty than younger people (U.S. Congress
1994). This transformation is especially remarkable because it
occurred at the same time that the average retirement age of men
fell from 65, the so-called “normal retirement” age, to 62 (Quinn
and Burkhauser 1994). Hence, most newly retiring men are
receiving up to 20 percent less in yearly Social Security benefits
than they would receive if they had waited until age 65 to retire.
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Both these phenomena are largely explained by substantial
increases in the retirement benefits paid by our public and private
retirement systems. In the 1970s, changes in the benefit
calculation rules led to an increase in inflation-adjusted Social
Security benefits of more than 50 percent. In addition, in 1974 the
federal Supplemental Security Income program replaced state
old-age assistance programs and established a minimum, cost-ofliving-adjusted income floor for everyone aged 65 and older.
These increases in government support for the elderly were
matched by a substantial increase in the scope and availability of
employer pension plans. Growth of the public and private
components of our retirement system significantly improved the
economic well-being of older people and strongly encouraged
workers to retire at earlier ages (Anderson, Burkhauser, and
Quinn 1986; Ippolito 1989; Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers 1990).
But the overall economic improvement at older ages captured by
comparing statistical averages obscures wide differences in
economic well-being within the population of older people as
well as the disproportionate risks of falling into poverty faced by
older women (Quinn 1989; Smeeding 1986). Ironically, the very
success of our retirement system in easing the initial transition
from work to retirement may have increased those risks,
especially for women. As we will see, Social Security does an
excellent job of providing income to married men and women
but is far less successful in assuring the same level of well-being
to the survivors of those marriages, the vast majority of whom are
women.
Table 1 provides information on the poverty status of older
women and men of different ages and marital status. It shows the
wide range of economic well-being within the older age
population. In general, women and men aged 75 and older have a
higher risk of poverty than those aged 65 to 74, and older married
couples are much less likely to live in poverty than are non3
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Table 1.

Relative Poverty Rates of Older Women and Men in
the United States in 1992 a

Age

All

Married

Widowed

Divorced,
Separated, or
Never Married

Aged 65 and over
All
Women
Men
Ratio of Women to
Men

12.9
15.7
8.9
1.76

6.4
6.6
0.97

21.5
15.0
1.43

26.0
17.6
1.48

Aged 65 to 74
All
Women
Men
Ratio of Women to
Men

10.7
12.7
8.1
1.57

5.6
6.0
0.93

18.9
13.7
1.38

25.6
18.1
1.41

Aged 75 to 84
All
Women
Men
Ratio of Women to
Men

15.3
18.9
9.7
1.95

8.0
7.5
1.07

23.2
15.7
1.48

27.0
16.5
1.64

Aged 85 and Over
All
Women
Men
Ratio of Women to
Men

19.8
22.7
13.2
1.72

NA
10.5

23.8
16.7
1.43

NA
NA

NA=not available due to unreliability of estimate. Population represents fewer
than 250,000 persons.
a
Poverty rates are measured here using official U.S. Bureau of the Census
poverty definitions.

Source: Derived from Table A.7, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and
Means, 1994, 1994 Green Book: Background Material and Data on
Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 860.
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married older people. But what is most striking in the table is the
disproportionate risk of poverty faced by women.
Older women are 76 percent more likely to be poor than older
men—15.7 percent versus 8.9 percent. Overall, older women are
more likely to be in poverty than older men because
#

when they are not sharing resources with a man in
marriage, the ratio of female to male poverty exceeds
1.00;

#

among older people, the average woman is older than the
average man; and

#

at all ages women are less likely to be married.

Hence, women have higher poverty risks within each age-marital
state, except when married, and they also dominate the agemarital states associated with a higher risk of poverty. It is this
wide disparity between the economic well-being of older women
and men that constitutes the most pressing unfinished business of
social policy toward the aged.

A Cross-National Perspective
Among older persons in the United States the risk of poverty is
substantially greater for those over age 75, for the non-married,
and for women. A comparison of the United States and seven
other post-industrialized nations in Table 2 shows that neither the
absolute size of the older poverty population nor the
disproportionate risk of poverty of older women is inevitable.
Rather, the absolute and relative poverty risk faced by older nonmarried women in the United States is considerably higher than
in any other country in our sample.
As can be seen in Table 2, in the United States, the 6.0 percent
5
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poverty rate of older married households was well below the 13.5
percent poverty rate of younger households in 1986, while the
17.6 percent poverty rate for older non-married women was well
above it. Furthermore, there was a wide difference between the
poverty rates of older non-married women and older married
couples in the United States—17.6 percent versus 6.0 percent, or
11.6 percentage points.
This pattern of both higher absolute and higher relative poverty
of non-married women is unique to the United States. In every
country shown in Table 2 except Germany, the most recent
poverty rate of older non-married women as well as of older
couples is below the poverty rate of younger households. Hence,
non-married older women in the United States are not only the
poorest group among the aged in these post-industrialized
countries, they are also the only group with poverty rates
significantly higher than both those of the nonaged population
and the older married population of their country.
Only in the United States, Germany, and Canada are older
women who live alone substantially worse off than older couples.
However, the difference is smaller in Germany and Canada, as is
the level of poverty. In Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and the
United Kingdom, poverty rates for both older groups are very low
and nearly equal. In Australia, non-married older women actually
have a lower poverty rte than do older couples, though the
difference—0.4 percentage points—is quite small. In the last
column of Table 2 we show that older non-married women in the
United States have a poverty rate from 3 to more than 40 times as
high as their counterparts in the other post-industrialized
countries in our sample.
The Treatment of Survivors by Social Security
The disparity between the economic well-being of married and
7

Table 2.

Poverty Rates by Age and Household Type across Modern Post-Industrialized Countries a

Aged 65 and Over

Country
United States
Canada
Australia
Germany
Sweden

The
Netherlands

1986
1983

3.1
6.1

Non-married
Women
(A)
21.5
17.6
7.5
3.2
2.3
3.8
7.0
0.0
1.7
3.2
0.4
5.8

Married
Couples
(B)
8.1
6.0
1.8
0.6
3.2
4.2
4.2
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.9
1.5

-0.5
4.3

Ratio of Poverty
Rates for NonMarried Women:
United States to
Other
na
na
2.9
5.5
9.3
4.6
3.1
c
10.3
6.7
44.0
3.7

1987
5.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
c
1979
6.0
0.5
1.1
-0.6
43.0
1984
6.2
0.8
0.7
0.1
22.0
a
Poverty rates are measured as the percentage of poor in each type of household where poverty is measured as household sizeadjusted income below 40 percent of the country’s median household size-adjusted income using an equivalence scale that counts
the first person at 1.0 and all subsequent persons at .5.
b
All household units with a head under age 65.

France
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United
Kingdom

Year
1979
1986
1981
1987
1981
1985
1981
1981
1987
1979

Aged 64
and Under b
13.4
13.5
9.0
8.9
6.8
7.2
2.4
5.4
7.7
2.4

Difference in
Poverty Rates within
Older Population
(A-B)
13.4
11.6
5.7
2.6
-0.9
-0.4
2.8
0.0
1.5
3.2
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non-married Americans in their retirement years that we report in
Tables 1 and 2 might not be a serious problem if the period of
widowhood or divorce in this country were relatively short. But
two important social phenomena have combined to lengthen this
time period for older women and thus exacerbate the disparity.

8

#

Increased life expectancy of women relative to men. In
the United States, one-third of all women are widowed by
the time they reach age 65. More than half are widowed
by age 75. At age 85, more than two-thirds are widows.
Furthermore, the expected years of widowhood for such
women are far more than the four year difference in life
expectancy between women and men at these ages since
most women marry older men. A 65-year-old widow can
anticipate living another 18 years. Women widowed at age
70 have a life expectancy of 11 years, and 9 years at age
85. For younger wives, widowhood will be even longer. It
is estimated that women will on average spend 17 years as
a widow (Population Resource Center 1994; Siegel and
Taeuber 1986).

#

Decreased retirement age of men, discussed earlier.
This, together with the extension of the period between
the death of a husband and the death of his spouse, has
increased the total number of years a woman will spend in
retirement, both as a wife and widow. For example, by the
year 2010, a man reaching age 62 is projected to live an
additional 18 years. If he dies at age 80, his widow, if she
is the same age, can expect to live another 11 years. She
will thus live in retirement for a total of 29 years. Hence,
at retirement this 62-year-old couple must estimate
consumption needs for a period of almost 30 years and try
to make appropriate decisions about the allocation of their
resources.

Burkhauser & Smeeding
Therefore, social policymakers must consider not only how wellbeing changes as households move into retirement but also how it
changes in the years after retirement and especially after the death
of a spouse. Burkhauser, Butler, and Holden (1991) used data
from the Retirement History Survey to trace the economic wellbeing of married couples following the husband’s retirement.
Using hazard modeling techniques, they showed that the risk of
falling into poverty decreases over time for couples who survive
over the period of the analysis (1969-1979). The same is true for
the households of widowers. But for households of widows not
only does the risk of falling into poverty not decrease over time,
it dramatically increases following the death of a spouse.
Part of the reason for this increase stems from rules governing
our Social Security system. The Social Security Act was passed
in 1935 and amended to include benefits for survivors and
dependents in 1939. At that time, the one-earner family was the
norm. The husband worked in the marketplace and the wife
worked at home. Work patterns have changed dramatically since
then, but Social Security payout rules have not. This has led to
serious inequities between two- and one-earner households,
which become more pronounced after the death of a spouse.
Table 3 compares two couples with identical combined Social
Security-covered average yearly earnings of $60,600, but with a
different division of earnings between the wife and the husband.
The first couple, in which all earnings are the husband’s, receives
a total Social Security benefit of $21,600 per year. The retired
worker is paid $14,400 and his wife receives a spouse benefit
equal to one-half of her husband’s retired-worker benefit. After
his death, the widow receives the husband’s worker benefit of
$14,400 in place of her spouse benefit. Note that for this
“traditional family” the survivor benefit is two-thirds of the total
amount previously paid to the couple.

9
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Table 3.

Couple
One
Earner
Husband
Wife
Total

Benefits Payable to Couples in 1995 with
Identical Total Earnings Through 1994a
Average
Lifetime
Earnings b

$60,000
--$60,600

Social Security Benefits
Surviv
Couple
or

$14,400
7,200
$21,600

Survivor
Benefit/Coup
le Benefit

2/3
$14,40
0

Two
Earner
Husband
$30,300
$9,636
Wife
$30,300
$9,636
1/2
Total
$60,600
$19,272
$9,636
a
This example assumes both the husband and wife are age 65 in 1995
when they retire.
b
This example is a one-earner couple, where the husband has earned the
taxable maximum over his career, and a two-earner couple who have each
earned one-half the taxable maximum. Earnings are assumed to begin at
age 22.
Source: Social Security Administration Office of the Actuary, June 1994.

The second couple, in which earnings are equally split, pays the
same amount of taxes into the system but receives lower yearly
retirement benefits of $19,272 while the husband is alive. Each
retiree receives an identical retired-worker benefit of $9,636.
Under current rules, neither would be better off electing toreceive
the spouse benefit, which is less than the spouse’s own retiredworker benefit ($4,818 versus $9,636 in this case) and the spouse
must choose one or the other. Furthermore, upon the husband’s
death the widow can elect to receive either a survivor benefit of
$9,636, based on her husband’s earnings record, or continue to
receive her own benefit of $9,636, but not both. Hence, benefits
for the widow in this “nontraditional family” are only one-half of
the already lower total benefits previously paid to the couple.
10
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Not only does a two-earner couple paying the same amount of
taxes into the system as a one-earner couple receive a smaller
total benefit, but the relative difference in benefits also increases
after the death of the husband. These two examples define the
extremes of the family payouts implicit in the Social Security
benefit structure. A widow whose retired-worker benefit is more
than half her husband’s retired-worker benefit will receive
payments somewhere between these two extremes.
To maintain the same standard of living for the survivor as that
previously enjoyed by the couple, using official poverty-line
equivalence guidelines, a survivor should receive 80 percent of
the previous income going to the couple. Yet we have seen that,
at best, Social Security benefits received after a spouse’s death
are 67 percent of those received by the couple and may drop as
low as 50 percent. This has ominous implications for
policymakers interested in reducing the disparity between the
well-being of women before and after the death of their husbands.
Social Security will continue to be the single most important
source of income for the majority of retired people (Reno 1993).
And the future elderly are much more likely to come from twoearner families in which the woman’s retired-worker benefit
exceeds her spouse benefit. Hence, on average the rate of Social
Security benefits paid after the death of a spouse will continue to
decline over the next decades.
This inequity in the Social Security benefit structure has been the
subject of several government studies (Committee on Ways and
Means 1985; Congressional Budget Office 1986), and several
proposals have been made to end it (see, for instance, various
authors in Burkhauser and Holden 1982). But reluctance on the
part of Congress to either reduce the benefits of one-earner
families or raise the taxes necessary to equalize the benefits for
two-earner households has stalled a solution.

11
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A Budget Neutral Proposal for Social Security Reform
No one consciously “planned” for Social Security to overprotect
married couples and underprotect survivors, most of whom are
women. But income security policy has consistently offered the
greatest level of protection to traditional married men. A
traditional male married a younger woman; he is the primary
earner in the family; and he dies on average at least a decade
before his wife. Hence, in making choices among different ways
to expand Social Security protection—an earlier retirement age,
higher benefits while both husband and wife are alive, higher
benefits to the survivor—the first two have prevailed over the
third.
Historically the replacement rate—the amount of wages replaced
by Social Security benefits in the first year of retirement—has
been the most important measure of Social Security protection. In
the early 1970s, Social Security payouts were dramatically
enlarged and replacement rates were substantially increased.
Thanks in large part to those increases, the poverty rate of older
married couples plummeted and, as Tables 1 and 2 suggest, is
quite low relative to either older non-married persons or younger
households in general. This is true even though the average age at
which men receive Social Security benefits has slipped from
around age 65 to about age 62 over the last three decades. Since
yearly Social Security benefits are actuarially reduced by 20
percent for workers who accept them at age 62, the current level
of income security enjoyed by older married couples is even more
remarkable. Unfortunately, as we have seen, the tremendous
success of Social Security policy in allowing men to retire earlier
and still evade poverty during their retirement years has not been
shared by their widows.
While there are several methods of dealing with this
vulnerability, most of them involve large budgetary outlays (see
12
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congressional Budget Office 1986). Not all solutions need take
this form. The revenue-neutral solution we propose is to shift part
of the current benefits going to married couples to survivors.
Small reductions in replacement rates at retirement would allow
substantial revenues to flow to survivors. Furthermore, part of the
drop in the replacement rate could be made up by short delays in
retirement by men. Finally, it appears that reducing income to
older married couples (who from both a national and crossnational perspective are relatively free of poverty) and
redistributing this same income to the survivor (who from both a
national and cross-national perspective is least free from poverty)
would hurt women little when they are married while helping
them substantially when they are survivors and most vulnerable.
#

For traditional families (one wage earner and one
spouse), we would shift from a two-thirds survivor benefit
to a three-quarters survivor benefit. This would mean, for
instance, that the survivor of a family receiving $1,000 per
month when both husband and wife are alive would
receive $750 per month rather than the current $667 per
month. This 75 percent survivor benefit would be closer
to 80 percent of the couple’s combined benefit necessary
to keep the survivor at the same equivalent standard of
living, consistent with the official poverty equivalence
measure discussed above.

#

We would change the way Social Security rules currently
treat nontraditional families (two earners). As we have
seen, a husband and wife who both work, whose worklife
earnings are both equal, and whose combined income is
the same as that of a traditional husband, pay the same
amount of taxes into the Social Security system as the
traditional husband. Yet their combined Social Security
benefits upon retirement are lower than those paid to the
one-earner family. Even worse, with respect to the
13
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transition to widowhood, the survivor of this two-worker
family on receives 50 percent of their combined joint
retirement benefits. We propose to provide survivors of
two-earner families the same three-quarters survivor
benefit recommended for one-earner families, and base it
on the total benefit paid to the couple before the death of
the spouse.
Finally, we would change the current way Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) treats Social Security benefits by raising the amount
of benefits not counted as income from $20 per month, the
amount set in 1974, to its inflation-adjusted equivalent in 1994
(approximately $60 per month) and indexing this protected
amount in the future to the inflation rate. This would shelter a
larger amount of Social Security benefits from the dollar-fordollar loss in SSI benefits under the current rules. (See
Burkhauser and Smeeding 1981 for a fuller discussion of the
effect of the interaction of SSI and Social Security on the poor.)
This is the most target-efficient way of increasing the income of
poor Social Security beneficiaries. In addition, these increases to
poor older couples would offset most of the losses related to the
payment scheme discussed below.
These proposals could substantially increase the cost of Social
Security, depending on how quickly they were phased in. One
way to pay the increase would be to raise Social Security taxes,
but we favor an alternate proposal. We would hold the total
package of Social Security benefits provided to a family constant
over the combined lifetime of the couple, but shift some benefits
from the period when they are both alive to the period when one
is a survivor.
In the long run this could be financed by a change in the formula
for adjusting past earnings for inflation. For instance, shifting
from a wage-based index to a price-based index would slightly
14
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reduce the replacement rate for retiring workers over time but
would provide the money necessary to fund a three-quarters
survivor benefit annuity. Another long-term solution would be to
use a less generous benefit formula. Both these benefit-shifting
methods would slightly reduce the replacement rate but
substantially increase protection for survivors. One way to
immediately provide revenues would be to shift the first 1 or 2
percent of future scheduled increases in Social Security benefits
that would normally go to offsetting inflation to current
survivors.
Our proposals for Social Security reform are in the spirit of the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-397) which
required employer pensions to pay workers in the form of a joint
and last-survivor annuity (pension payments that continue
following the death of either the worker or spouse) rather than as
a single-life annuity (higher yearly pension payments which end
with the death of the worker) unless the worker and the worker’s
spouse sign a document requesting a single-life annuity. This
legislation was passed to encourage workers to shift benefits
toward survivors in a revenue-neutral way.
Substantial improvement in the average economic well-being of
the aged must not blind us to the fact that our current retirement
system has not ended all risks to economic well-being in old age.
The dramatic increase in private and public retirement income
available for people at older ages has virtually eliminated drops
into poverty for married older couples, not only in the first period
of retirement but for years after. But it has not meant equivalent
protection for surviving spouses, most of whom are women. As
women spend more of their lifetime in work outside the home,
they will be more likely to earn their own employer or Social
Security pensions. But this increase in their direct retirement
benefit payments may be considerably offset by the structure of
obsolete Social Security payout rules, which no longer reflect the
15
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changed working patterns of men and women within marriage. It
is long past time to address the underprotection of women by our
current Social Security system. Our proposals provide a concrete,
budget neutral method of substantially reducing the
disproportionate risk of poverty faced by older women.

16
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